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Inequity aversion can be defined as the re-
fusal of gains or strong, negative emotional be-
havior when there is an unfair distribution of out-
comes (Brosnan & de Waal, 2014; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). Aversion to inequity may be in-
vestigated by the use of an inequity game, an ex-
perimental procedure derived from the economic 
games literature (see McAuliffe, Blake, Steinbeis, 
& Warneken, 2017). In this game, an allocation is 
distributed between two players (Player One and 
Player Two) by an experimenter. If Player One 
accepts the allocation, both players receive their 
allocated payoffs. If Player One rejects the alloca-
tion, neither player receives a payoff. Rejection of 
an unequal distribution may be used as a meas-
ure of inequity aversion. Inequity aversion may 
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occur in situations of disadvantageous inequity 
(DI), in which one rejects an outcome that is less 
than that of a partner. Inequity aversion may also 
occur in situations of advantageous inequity (AI), 
in which one rejects an outcome that is more than 
that of a partner.  
With respect to the ontogenesis of humans’ 
“sense of fairness”, there seem to be important 
differences between aversion to DI and AI (Blake 
et al., 2015; McAuliffe, Blake, Kim, Wrangham, & 
Warneken, 2013; Corbit, McAuliffe, Callaghan, 
Blake, & Warneken, 2017). Children across di-
verse societies show aversion to DI as young as 4 
years old (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al., 
2015; McAuliffe et al., 2013; Shaw & Olson, 2012). 
In contrast, emergence of aversion to AI is more 
variable. Blake et al. (2015), for example, found 
evidence of AI in older children (8 years old) in 
some countries (the US, Canada, and Uganda), 
but not in other countries (India, Mexico, Peru, 
and Senegal). Aversion to AI may be more related 
to social cues and cultural context than aversion 
to DI, in that it is strongly observed and varies 
less between people from different cultures and 
individuals from different species, such as hu-
mans and monkeys (e.g., Blake et al., 2015; 
Brosnan & de Waal, 2014). In this paper, we ask 
if flexibility of aversion to DI may be best investi-
gated with experimental procedures with more 
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long-lasting opportunities to interact with a part-
ner. 
 There is interesting empirical evidence show-
ing that more long-lasting opportunities to inter-
act with a partner may have a strong influence on 
social behavior in test conditions (Abreu-Ro-
drigues, Natalino, & Aló, 2002; Avalos, Ribes-
Iñesta, Ortiz, & Serna, 2015; Marwell & Schmitt, 
1975; Ribes-Iñesta, Rangel, Pulido, Valdez, Ramí-
rez, Jiménez, & Hernández, 2010; Schmitt, 1998; 
Silverstein, Cross, Brown, & Rachlin, 1998). Typ-
ically, there is no programmed cost for social in-
teractions, but outcomes can vary due to some as-
pects of a partner’s behavior and the experi-
mental condition. In this kind of experimental 
strategy, there are usually at least two experi-
mental conditions, and participants may experi-
ence repeated interactions with a given partner 
under stable conditions before there is a change 
in experimental conditions. For experimental 
purposes, dyadic interactions may be controlled 
when one member of the dyad is a confederate.  
 An example of a procedure that involves a 
long-lasting opportunity to interact with a part-
ner is a puzzle task that can be shared with an-
other person (Avalos, Ribes-Iñesta, Ortiz, & 
Serna, 2015; Ribes-Iñesta, Rangel, Pulido, Valdez, 
Ramírez, Jiménez, 2010). The participant and a 
partner (who is a research confederate) need to 
solve puzzles, presented on individual computer 
screens that show both the participant’s puzzle 
and the confederate’s puzzle. The participant and 
confederate can put pieces on their own puzzle as 
well as on the other puzzle. If the participant or 
the confederate places a piece on their own puz-
zle, he/she receives 10 points. In addition, if the 
participant or confederate places a piece on the 
other person’s puzzle, they may both receive 10 
points (points delivery varied between studies). 
Participants (college students) rarely put pieces 
on the confederate’s puzzle when confederates 
put pieces only on their own puzzles in baseline 
sessions. Across experimental conditions, the 
percentage of pieces that the confederate placed 
on the participant’s puzzle varied from 0 to 25, 
50, 75, and 100%, in ascending or descending or-
der. Results showed that participants placed 
pieces on the confederate’s puzzle in the same 
proportion as the confederate placed pieces on 
the participants’ puzzle. The flexibility of cooper-
ative strategies has also been investigated by 
Silverstein, Cross, Brown, and Rachlin (1998). 
The study used a two-phase procedure with an 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Participants 
were initially assigned to one of four experi-
mental conditions in which they played with a 
confederate, and the confederate’s strategy var-
ied: (1) tit-for-tat, (2) play randomly, (3) always 
cooperate, or (4) always defect. In a second phase, 
participants played the prisoner’s dilemma game 
with each other (instead of with the confederate). 
During this latter condition, cooperation was the 
predominant strategy mainly for those partici-
pants previously exposed to the tit-for-tat condi-
tion. 
 Collectively, experimental results indicate 
that different cooperative behaviors may be flex-
ible in social situations, which requires a special 
analysis regarding the learning mechanisms in-
volved when one person’s decisions may be af-
fected by the other person’s behavior. The main 
aim of the present study was to devise a two-
phase experiment to investigate flexibility of 
aversion to DI in young adults as a result of dy-
adic interactions with AI. We investigated 
whether aversion to DI could be modulated by a 
previous experimental history in which a confed-
erate acted in a “friendly” manner that produced 
AI. We compared this situation with two control 
situations: one in which participants interacted 
with an “unhelpful” partner who did not permit 
AI and one in which participants did not have 
previous experience with a partner (they were ex-




Fifty-nine college students, ranging in age 
from 18 to 27 years, were recruited from a univer-
sity campus: 33 were female and 26 were male. 
All participants signed informed consent forms 
that had been approved by a Brazilian research 
ethics committee (process CAAE: 
19646713.4.0000.5561). 
 
Experimental Environment and Materials 
The experiment was conducted in a research 
room at the University of São Paulo. In the room, 
there were two tables and two chairs, a folding 
screen, and a whiteboard (Figure 1). The experi-
menter was stationed next to the whiteboard and 
had visual access to the participant and 
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confederate. The participant and the confederate 
sat at separate tables, and visual contact between 
them was limited by a folding screen positioned 
between them. They could only see each other’s 
hands, which card the other person played on 
each trial, and the outcome presented by the ex-
perimenter on the whiteboard. The participant 
and confederate each had a blue and a green card, 
and there was a space marked on each table indi-
cating where they needed to place the chosen 
cards on each trial. They also had access to a pen-
cil and notepad, on which they could write what-
ever they wanted. In a pre-experimental phase 
with four trials, all participants learned general 
rules about choosing cards, combinations of 
cards and outcomes, and the payoff matrix for 










The participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three experimental groups: friendly con-
federate (FRICON), unhelpful confederate 
(UNHCON), or control/no previous history 
(NOHIST). Fifteen participants in the FRICON 
group and all participants in the UNHCON 
group completed two experimental phases: In the 
first phase (labeled Phase AI), a history with a 
friendly or unhelpful confederate was manipu-
lated. In the second phase (labeled Phase DI), the 
production of DI was tested.  
There were 29 participants in the FRICON 
group, 15 participants in the UNHCON group, 
and 15 participants in the NOHIST group. In the 
FRICON group, 14 participants were excused 
from the experiment before Phase DI due to fail-
ure to meet the Phase AI criterion (see below). 
Data from these participants were not included in 
the overall data analysis. Participants in the 
NOHIST group only completed the test for DI 
(Phase DI). 
 
Experimental Task and Payoff Matrix  
On each trial, the outcomes for the partici-
pant and confederate were determined by the 
combined choices of blue and/or green cards. 
When the participant and confederate both chose 
the blue card, there was an inequitable outcome. 
When one or both choose a green card, there was 
an equitable outcome. In Phase AI, inequity was 
advantageous to the participant; in Phase DI, in-
equity was disadvantageous to the participant 
(Table 1). 
When the participant entered the experi-
mental room, the confederate was already sitting 
in one of the chairs, behind the screen. Written in-
structions were given to the participant and con-
federate simultaneously. The experimenter asked 
that instructions be read in silence. The instruc-
tions were: 
 
This study is not about intelligence, and it is 
not about assessing your intellectual abilities. 
When you’re done, you’ll get more explana-
tions. You will be working with a partner, and 
both of you will have an identical task to per-
form. You and your partner will receive two 
cards (one blue and one green). When the ex-
perimenter says the word “Attention,” you 
must make a choice: place your hand on the blue 
card or place your hand on the green card. After 
your choice, the experimenter will say the word, 
“Now!” At this point, put the chosen card in 
the place indicated on your desk so that you and 
your partner can see each other’s choices. On 
each trial, you will receive a certain number of 
points. The number of points you will receive 
depends on your choice and the choice of your 
partner. The experimenter will notify you when 
the session is finished. Please remain seated and 
do not talk to your partner or the experimenter 
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Table 1.
Payoff Matrix for Participants and Confederates in Phases AI and DI 
PHASE AI 




Confederate’s Choice Trials 
P C 
FRICON Blue-Blue* 5 2 Blue 15 
 
UNHCON Blue-Blue* 5 2 Green 15 
   
NOHIST (not exposed to this experimental phase) 
 
PHASE DI 




Confederate’s Choice Trials 
P C 
ALL GROUPS Blue-Blue* 2 5 Blue 12 
*Any other combination produced equal outcomes: 2 points to both players. 




during the session. All instructions are contained 
on this sheet. If you have questions, reread the in-
structions (do not ask the experimenter any ques-
tions). When you’re ready to begin, raise your 
right hand. 
 
After returning the paper with the general in-
structions, the participants received the follow-
ing specific instructions, also printed on paper:  
 
If you choose the blue card and the participant 
beside you also chooses the blue card (combina-
tion: blue–blue), you will earn five points and 
the participant next to you will earn two points. 
If you or your partner choose the green card 
(combinations: blue–green, green–blue, or 








After the participant read the general and 
specific instructions, there was a pre-experi-
mental phase that consisted of four trials. The  
confederate alternately chose the green and blue 
cards on these trials (i.e., green-blue-green-blue). 
The outcome on these trials was the same as that 
in the next phase: inequity favorable to the par-
ticipant in cases in which both players chose the 
blue card, and equity with any other card combi-
nation. The objective of this pre-experimental 
phase was to permit the participants to test the 
instructions about card choices and points distri-
butions. After the four trials, the experimental 
phase was initiated without any notification. 
Phase AI: advantageous inequity to the partici-
pant. In this phase, the confederate’s behavior 
varied depending on the participants’ experi-
mental group. The confederate’s behavior was 
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pre-determined in order to permit or prevent in-
equity favorable to the participant. In the 
FRICON group, the confederate used the blue 
card and allowed the participant to earn five 
points while the confederate earned two points 
on every trial. In the UNHCON group, the con-
federate used the green card and did not allow 
the participant to earn five points (i.e., both the 
participant and confederate earned two points) 
on every trial. There were 15 trials in this phase. 
For participants in the FRICON group, there was 
a criterion to finish the phase: Participants were 
only exposed to the next phase if they played the 
blue card on at least 10 trials, and the blue card 
was played on the last three trials. 
Phase DI: disadvantageous inequity to the partic-
ipant. At the beginning of this phase, the experi-
menter provided additional written instructions 
to the participant and confederate on how to earn 
points. These instructions indicated that the pay-
off matrix was reversed: now blue-card choices 
resulted in the confederate earning five points 
and the participant earning two. On every trial 
for all groups, the confederate always chose the 
blue card. There were 15 trials in Phase DI. This 
phase included the NOHIST group that received 
only the preliminary, general instructions about 
gains; also, this group was only exposed to Phase 
DI and thus did not have an experimental history 
with a friendly or unhelpful partner. 
 
Data Analysis 
The data file was organized in long format. 
Each data file record (each choice for each partic-
ipant) contained the following variables: partici-
pant identification (ID), participant’s choice 
(green, blue) (PC), phase (1, 2) (Phase), group 
(FRICON, UNHCON, NOHIST) (Group), and 
block (1, 2, 3) (Block). The total number of records 
was 1125. 
The dependent (outcome) variable was PC, 
and category Green was the reference category. 
A full factorial generalized linear mixed model 
with binomial distribution and logit link function 
(repeated measure logistic regression) was used 
to test the main variables. Fixed effects for factors 
Phase and Group was controlled by random ef-






Our main purpose with this experiment was 
to see if dyadic interactions with a confederate 
constrain aversion to DI for FRICON participants 
(compared to participants in UNCOHN and 
NOHIST groups). Our first analysis compared 
participants in the three experimental groups in 
two consecutive phases (AI and DI). 
Figure 2 depicts the results from the two 
phases for participants in FRICON and 
UNCOHN groups and from Phase DI for partici-
pants in NOHIST group. Closed markers show 
estimated marginal means and open markers 
show individual participant data in each phase. 
Considering participants in the FRICON group, 
there was a small decrease in blue choices in 
Phase DI. For these participants, blue choices 
were still more frequent than green choices in the 
second phase. For Participants in the UNCOHN 
group, in contrast, the percentage of trials on 
which participants chose the blue card dropped 
to close to 40% in Phase DI, indicating an unwill-
ingness to produce DI. The NOHIST group 
showed strong variability in choices: Some par-
ticipants choose the blue card on most of the tri-
als, but other participants choose the green card 
on most of the trials. This result clearly illustrates 
the importance of previous experience with AI 
regarding the more consistent data in Phase DI 
for participants in the FRICON and UNCOHN 
groups. 
For statistical comparisons, we adopted a sig-
nificance level of 0.05. The interaction effect was 
significant, F (1, 1120) = 25.354, p < 0.001. There 
was a simple main effect of Group for both 
Phases DI and AI, F (1, 1120) = 6.691, p = 0.01 and 
F (2, 1120) = 46.787, p < 0.001, respectively. Using 
pairwise contrasts in Phase DI, the differences 
among the levels for groups FRICON, 
UNHCON, and NOHIST were significant 
(FRICON - UNHCON: t (1120) = 9.373, Sidak ad-
justed p < 0.001, FRICON - NOHIST: t (1120) = 
2.535, Sidak adjusted p = 0.011, and UNHCON - 
NOHIST: t (1120) = 3.639, Sidak adjusted p = 
0.001). The estimated marginal means (adjusted 
proportion of blue card choices) were 0.928 and 
0.689 in Phase AI for groups FRICON and 
UNHCON, respectively, and were 0.799, 0.083, 
and 0.482 in Phase DI for groups FRICON, 
UNHCON, and NOHIST, respectively. 
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Figure 2 
 
Note. Blue and green choices in Phases AI and DI for participants in the FRICON and UNCOHN groups and in Phase 
DI for participants in the NOHIST. Closed markers show estimated marginal means and open markers show individual 
participant data in each phase. Error bars indicate confidence intervals of 95%. 
 
Figure 3 depicts the difference between 
groups in Phase AI in three blocks of five trials. 
Examining the data in smaller trial blocks shows 
whether differences between the FRICON and 
UNHCON groups in Phase AI occurred at the be-
ginning of the experiment or were established 
during that phase. At the beginning of the exper-
iment, participants from both groups chose the 
blue card on a similar number of trials initially, 
but they differed in the second and third block. 
Specifically, participants in the FRICON group 
began to make more blue-card choices, whereas 
those in the UNHCON group tended to make 
slightly fewer blue-card choices. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our results clearly show that previous per-
sonal history (Phase AI) affected decisions in a 
situation with DI. We clearly constrained aver-
sion to DI for FRICON participants. We were able 
to see this by comparing FRICON participants 
with UNHCON participants and also by compar-
ing these groups with the NOHIST group (parti- 
 
cipants who were not exposed to Phase AI). 
These results are very strong and consistent, even 
with a relatively small number of participants in 
each experimental group. Another way to con-
ceptualize these results is that participants who 
experienced a friendly confederate in Phase AI 
(i.e., a partner who permitted AI to the partici-
pant) produced DI to themselves in Phase DI.  
Our experimental strategy was successful in 
demonstrating how flexibility in inequity aver-
sion may be produced in a two-phase experi-
ment. The primary contribution of this strategy is 
that a majority of previous reports in the experi-
mental literature test inequity aversion using just 
a few trials presented in a single condition that 
are part of between-group strategies. There are, 
however, some limitations in our analysis that 
may be improved in future investigations. The 
main limitation is related to the criteria for ad-
vancing participants in the FRICON group to 
Phase DI: this criterion was used only for partici-
pants in that group, which may have biased the 
comparisons between groups in the Phase AI. 
The use of the same criteria for all participants in  
EAHB Bulletin 32 Vol. 32 
Figure 3 
 




the initial phase may produce more comparable 
results in different conditions. 
 The results of Phase DI resemble a “tit-for-
tat” situation that is common in behavioral 
games like the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (Axel-
rod, 1984). Research on reciprocity has created an 
interesting discussion related to the evolution of 
cooperation and has contributed to quantitative 
models of social behavior and cultural evolution 
(Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Developmental 
and cultural mechanisms may explain changes in 
inequity aversion at different age stages or group 
levels, respectively, but they are less predictive in 
dealing with the fact that inequity aversion may 
be established or constrained within the reper-
toire of a given individual. For this reason, cross-
cultural variation about fairness is sometimes 
hard to interpret and open to discussion about 
which psychological or cultural mechanisms are 
at work (Delton, Krasnow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
2010).  
 Our results may help integrate contributions 
from learning principles (usually described as 
content-independent processes) with evolution-
ary mechanisms that promote sociality (usually 




Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Questions about learn-
ing are usually best investigated by using proce-
dures that permit long-lasting interactions be-
tween participants in a cooperative task before a 
test. The literature on associative learning phe-
nomena, for example, has repeatedly illustrated 
that learning rarely occurs in just one or a few tri-
als and often requires long-lasting interactions 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Reciprocity and ineq-
uity aversion may be strongly explained by 
evolved mechanisms. However, at the same time, 
the results from Phases AI and DI suggest a cu-
mulative effect of learning during the dyadic in-
teractions. This effect may be also partially ex-
plained by the principles of stimulus control (Sid-
man, 2000; Urcuioli, 2013) because in Phase AI 
the confederate’s behavior (blue or green choices) 
is a condition associated with different rates of 
point’s delivery. The effects of arousal (Killeen, 
Hanson, & Osborne, 1978) may also aid in under-
standing differences between participants in 
FRICON and UNHCON groups: Arousal refers 
to the cumulative activation of behavior by the 
presentation of outcomes (e.g., points gained on 
each trial of a game) that can only be fully ob-
served once participants have had multiple expo-
sures to the same type of trial (Killeen & Sitomer, 
2003).  
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 As in other fields of psychology, the question 
is not about “innate” versus “acquired,” but, ra-
ther, is a matter of identifying mechanisms and 
how those different mechanisms work and are in-
tegrated (Tooby, Cosmides, & Barrett, 2005). This 
is an exciting avenue to explore because it per-
mits reconciliation of a genetic disposition to be-
have in a cooperative manner with the role of per-
sonal experience.  
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